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Abstract. Challenges caused by the global economic crisis in connection with the structural, political changes 
transformed the construction, the nature, and the operation of the executive branch. During the last decades in the 
separation of powers’ system the state had been rediscovered and governmental power had been appreciated.
In a world covered with the internet, financial, economic and political crisis situations appeared; governments 
and governmental centres had to give sufficient answers to global challenges. The world under the pressure of the 
media changed the daily routine of the governmental work: beside the good decision-making, carrying the 
governments’ point across parliaments and public opinion too became increasingly significant. Strengthening the 
symbiosis between the legislative and executive branch in parliamentary governmental systems can be observed. 
Members of the governing party attending the rigorous party discipline are decreasingly able to function as 
democratic control. These members rather become patronisers (‘voting machines’) of the governmental intention 
without critical voices. The personality of the politicians coming to the front and the marketability of the politics in 
the media also strengthened the process which resulted in the intensity of the Prime Minister’s role within the 
executive branch. Increasing the role of the Prime Minister and governmental central bodies lead to the weakening 
of the government’s corporative character, and the government’s gaining ground opposed to the Parliament. 
According to international examples in significant western European parliamentary democracies (for example: 
United Kingdom: Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, Italy: Silvio Berlusconi, Sweden: Göran Persson) the role of 
the Prime Minister (as the head of the government) also appreciably strengthened. Beside this attitude, the 
outsourcing of each governmental function (good governance), the sufficiency of state’s strengthening (good 
government), and making governmental public services available electronically (e-government) are also under 
hard discussion.
The aim of this paper is to review – based on new constitutional and other changes of public law – the 
centralization of the head of the Hungarian government; the strengthening of the ‘chancellor-principle’ by the 
Hungarian Fundamental Law; and the process that lead to the Prime Minister’s Office becoming ‘top chancery’. 
The paper takes into consideration the transformation of the separation of powers’ system and the strengthening of 
the Prime Minister’s role within the executive branch and its affect on the Hungarian administrative system.
Keywords: government and governance, Fundamental Law, separation of powers, centralisation of public 
administration, presidentialisation, political responsibility, principle of confidence, central administrative bodies
1. REINVENTING GOVERNMENT AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The global social and financial challenges within the narrowing national margin demanded 
the strengthening of governmental activities for national strategic goals. Financial, 
economical, and political crises have appeared at an unbelievable rate in the “interconnected” 
world, meaning that it was necessary for governments’ to have a quick response. All of 
these processes placed the quick decision making ability and effectiveness of governmental 
centres in the spotlight. The media-centred world changed the government’s casual work; 
besides making good decisions it became increasingly important to make parliaments as 
well as the general public accept these decisions. Proactive communication became an 
integral part of governing and frequent media coverage became a basic requirement for 
politicians. In parliamentary systems strengthening the symbiosis between the legislative 
and the executive branches can be detected. Those governing party MP’s who followed 
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the strict party discipline were hindered in their ability to fulfil the role of democratic 
control. This resulted in becoming the unquestioning supporters of government aims, like 
the “voting machine”. The “personification” (bringing the personality of politicians to the 
fore) and “mediatisation” (making politics a good product for selling in the media) of 
politics further enhanced the processes that led to the presidentialisation1 of the executive 
power. The Increasing role of the Prime Minister and the governmental centre resulted in 
weakening the corporate character of government and in the dominance of government over 
parliament. Series of international examples have shown how in western European 
parliamentary democracies (e.g. Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair in Great Britain, Silvio 
Berlusconi in Italy, Göran Persson in Sweden) the Prime Minister’s role have increased. In 
addition to presidentialisation there were heated debates about outsourcing and marketisation 
of certain government tasks (good governance), and the necessity of strengthening the role 
of the state (good government).2 The digitalisation of social and economic processes and 
the information society changed everyday life resulting in the establishment of electronic 
administration (e-government). Without analysing and taking in account these developments 
the research of the constitutional role of government would be incomplete.
2. THE CHANGE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
OF THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT
The Fundamental Law of Hungary did not bring along significant changes with regards to 
the position of the government within the state system: the government system of Hungary 
remained a parliamentary republic. The principle of the separation of powers is enshrined in 
the Fundamental Law. Additionally, the structural and political changes which occurred 
since the Hungarian transition transformed the structure, the nature and the functioning of 
the executive branch are also included in the Fundamental Law. In order to analyse the 
constitutional position of the Government, it is necessary to show first the processes that 
resulted in the rediscovering of the state and also resulted in the rise of governmental 
powers during the last decades.
Regarding the constitutional status3 of the executive power and the government the 
Fundamental Law – continuing the tradition of the last 20 years – took the position of 
continuity. The state system of Hungary is still characterised by the parliamentary type of 
government, together with the responsibility of the executive power given to the Parliament. 
However, unlike the previous constitution, the above cited Article 15 of the Fundamental 
1 On the level of the executive power the “presidentialisation” of politics means the 
strengthening of the Prime Minister’s power, and the weakening of the corporate character of the 
Government. The stronger power of the heads of government means that numbers of areas under their 
direct control are increasing, and also their ability strengthens by which they can successfully resist 
political players having different views. On this topic see: Poguntke et al. (2005) 4–6. 
2 See in detail: Stumpf (2014) 104–107. 
3 The most important sources of law defining the status of the Hungarian Government are the 
following: Articles 15-23 of the Fundamental Law, Act XLIII of 2010 on the central administrative 
bodies and the status of undersecretaries (Ksztv.), Act XX of 2014 on the list of ministries, furthermore: 
Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly, Act CXIX of 2011 on administrative officials, Act 
CXXVI of 2010 on the Capital and County Government agencies, and the Acts of each administrative 
body.
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Law defines the position and function of the government within the whole constitutional 
system.4 Compared to the Constitution, defining the constitutional role of the government is 
a step forward, yet the Fundamental Law still does not give a substantial definition of the 
executive power, for example the classic role of executing legal acts, which derives from 
the function of the government.
The Government has received a double function with regards to its constitutional 
position. First, the government is the general body of the executive branch, with a large 
scale of powers, positioned at the head of the public administration, being responsible for 
its actions. Secondly, in a broad sense, the government is the decision making centre of the 
whole political system, its governing role, besides its enforcement role, also includes the 
political control of the legislative. The role of governing is political natured, but government 
has legally regulated power, therefore it carries out its executive-regulative activities within 
constitutional boundaries. The power of the government can encompass all matters which 
are not expressly assigned by the Fundamental Law or a rule of law to the tasks and 
competences of another organ. Due to the separation and functional division of powers the 
primary responsibility of the executive branch is to carry out and enforce the execution of 
political decisions – acts of parliament, government decrees, and various normative and 
unique decisions. Political execution consists of at least three functions: program making, 
transforming political aims to law, and controlling the administrative execution.5 As the 
central organisation of the administration, government has significant freedom in creating 
bodies, and wide decision making powers with regards to the issues within its competency. 
The government has autonomous legislative power when carrying out its functions. The 
government can adopt decrees under authorization given by an act of Parliament or without 
authorization. Through the controlling power,6 the government has a decisive influence on 
the top level of public administration, and therefore upon the actions of any subordinated 
body. This way the government ensures the coordinated actions of the hierarchical system 
of public administration, as well as the efficient functioning of the modern state.
The fact that the Fundamental Law highlights the governmental functions points to the 
increased significance of the executive power. Governing is exercising power and par 
excellence a political activity, therefore much more than the “high command” of public 
administration. The government has a crucial role in defining state functions and determining 
the aim and contents of state actions. Governments play a significant role in shaping the 
work of the Parliament. Through the preparation and submission of laws, the government 
influences significantly the topics debated by the parliament (legislative program). By 
submitting the act on annual budget the government defines the priorities of distributing 
available resources, as well as the main directions of government activities. The need for 
“good governance” was created by the global challenges that transformed state functions, 
and the strong demand for serving the public good. Modern governing, the exercising of 
state powers is increasingly interconnected with the function of managing public services 
4 According to Article 15 paragraph 1 and 2 of the Basic Law: “The Government is the general 
means of executive power; its tasks and competencies shall encompass all that is not expressly 
conferred by the Fundamental Law or any other legislation under the competence of another body. 
The Government shall answer to Parliament. The Government shall be the principal organ of public 
administration; it may establish government agencies pursuant to provisions laid down by law.”
5 Hine (1993) 197. 
6 The legal definition of control is given by Art. 2 paragraph 1 of the Ksztv.
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and public bodies. In a constitutional sense the government, as the top of the executive 
branch, is trusted with leading the state, and enjoys a wide freedom of movement from the 
Parliament that elected them as well as against the judicial branch.
3. THE CENTRALISATION OF GOVERNMENT:  
THE STATUS OF THE PRIME MINISTER, PRESIDENTIALISATION
The Fundamental Law did not reform the tradition that was formed after the Hungarian 
political transition, asking the leader of the political party that has the best chance of 
winning majority support to form a government. In a constitutional sense the President is 
free to decide, he has no obligation to discuss possibilities with the leaders of the political 
parties that were in parliament before making his decision (however political rationality 
would suggest otherwise). Because of the President’s obligation to control the democratic 
functioning of the state, the President is interested in nominating someone for Prime 
Minister who is likely to be elected by the (super) majority of the Parliament.7 According to 
the Act on the Parliament of Hungary, every state official is elected by a secret voting 
procedure, except for the Prime Minister, where there is a public vote. As for the time limit 
of the presidential nomination the Fundamental Law repeats the previous regulations, and 
also defines new, shorter deadlines. If the mandate of the Prime Minister ceased at the 
moment of the inaugural meeting of the newly elected Parliament the nomination has to be 
made at the inaugural meeting. If his mandate is terminated by resigning, death, the 
declaration of conflict of interest, because of the lack of the conditions mandatory for 
election, or because the Parliament has voted for no confidence against the Prime Minister, 
the President is obliged to make his nomination within 15 days after the termination of the 
Prime Minister’s mandate. If the nominated person is not elected by the parliament, the 
President makes a new nomination within 15 days. If the absolute majority of the Parliament 
does not fall in line with the nominations, and the Prime Minister is not elected within 40 
after the first nomination, the President is entitled to dissolve the Parliament. [Fundamental 
Law, Art. 3, para. (3), point a)]
The Fundamental Law instituted an important change in connection with the 
termination of the Prime Minister’s mandate. The constitution (Act XX of 1949) stipulated 
the cases of the termination of the Government’s mandate, whereas the Fundamental Law 
– thus underlining the importance of the constitutional status of the Prime Minister – 
explicitly refers to the cases of the termination of the Prime Minister’s mandate, at the same 
time terminates the government’s mandate as well. [Article 20] According to the rules of 
the Fundamental Law, there are seven cases when the Prime Minister’s mandate is 
terminated: a) after the inaugural meeting of the newly elected parliament, b) if the 
Parliament elects a new Prime Minister by a constructive motion of no confidence, c) if the 
Prime Minister fails the vote of confidence initiated by himself, d) by the resignation of the 
Prime Minister, e) by death, f) by the declaration of conflict of interest, g) if the conditions 
necessary for his election are no longer met.
The Fundamental Law also stipulates what to do after losing the vote of confidence. 
Unlike the previous regulation, after losing the vote of confidence, the Government and the 
7 Article 16 paragraph 3 and 4 of the Fundamental Law: “[t]he Prime Minister shall be elected 
by Parliament on a recommendation by the President of the Republic. A simple majority of votes cast 
by Members of Parliament shall be required to elect the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister shall take 
office immediately upon his or her election.”
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Prime Minister do not have to resign, but rather their mandates are terminated automatically. 
In four of the above mentioned cases the Parliament decides the fate of the Prime Minister’s 
mandate. The Fundamental Law, in order to separate different events of termination of 
the Prime Minister’s mandate, sets forth that in cases of the vote of no confidence, the vote 
of more than half of all members is required, whereas in the cases of point f) and point 
g) – demanding a larger majority – the vote of two-thirds of attendant members is needed. 
The Parliament votes on both the conflict of interest and the lack of requirements needed 
for election upon the written motion of any member of parliament, within 30 days. The 
Government, from the termination of its mandate until the formation of a new government, 
functions as a caretaker government [Article 22]. The former double limitations were 
upheld; the caretaker government may not recognize the binding force of international 
treaties and may adopt decrees only in case of urgency and on the basis of express 
authorization provided by an act of Parliament. The various cases of termination of the 
Prime Minister’s mandate carry different consequences in relation to the question of who 
should exercise the powers of the Prime Minister. According to the Fundamental Law, if the 
mandate of the Prime Minister is terminated upon his or her resignation or upon the 
inauguration of a newly-elected Parliament, the Prime Minister serves as a caretaker Prime 
Minister until the new Prime Minister is elected. In this case however, he has limited 
constitutional capacity: he may not propose the dismissal of a minister or the appointment 
of a new minister, and may issue a decree only in case of urgency and on the basis of 
express authorization provided by an act of Parliament. In all other cases, except for the 
case of no confidence, the deputy Prime Minister exercises the powers of the Prime 
Minister, with the aforementioned limitations, until the new Prime Minister is elected.
The constitutional and political character of the Prime Minister – beyond the previously 
shown general direction-giving and policy-making role – have been formed by other 
regulations of the Fundamental Law. The Prime Minister is the defining character of the 
Government, but he also has powers separate from the Government that he exercises on his 
own responsibility. Defining the general political direction obviously greatly influence the 
recruiting and selection of ministers. The Prime Minister may come up against some 
political boundaries upon changing the composition of the government, but in a 
constitutional sense there is no limitation to dismissing ministers and appointing new 
persons. The Fundamental Law defines several competences of the Prime Minister. In 
comparison with the previous legislation it is a new element that he can define tasks for 
ministers [Article 18 para. (2)] and he can ask for information from them. Furthermore he 
can appoint or nominate the leaders of autonomous regulatory bodies, and may appoint a 
deputy. It is within his traditional powers to issue decrees, give opinions on the dissolution 
of parliament, take part and speak in parliamentary sessions. The Prime Minister has powers 
and an obligation to cooperate in times of emergency; he is a member of the National 
Defence Council assembled in the time of national emergency. As the head of government 
he chairs government sessions, and has a defining role in organising the work of the 
government. He represents Hungary and its government in international relations, especially 
within the European Union.
The gaining of ground of the presidentialisation undoubtedly influences the Prime 
Minister (chancellor)-type of government functioning. From among the reasons of the 
international trend of presidentialisation the weakening of traditional ruptures of society, 
the redefining of the role of the state, one of the most important reasons is the growing 
significance of mass media in politics. Many scholars believe that the presidentialisation 
can only occur in parliamentary systems, while others think that it can happen in any system 
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of government, even in presidential or semi-presidential systems. In parliamentary 
democracies the institutional status of the head of government is mainly characterised by 
the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch, the formal and informal 
strength of the Prime Ministers position within the government, and the status of the 
constitutional institutions that are capable of balancing the power of the Prime Minister.8
In the Hungarian constitutional system, the constitutional regulations (decision making 
powers, forms of political responsibility) make the Prime Minister the central figure of state 
governing. Our parliamentary system is characterised by the German-style “medium strong” 
governing of the Prime Minister.9 The Fundamental Law does not just uphold the Prime 
Minister-based (chancellor type) government model, but rather strengthens it.10 The 
Fundamental Law explicitly makes it the Prime Minister’s right and obligation to define the 
general politics of the Government („Richtlinienkompetenz”), formally making him 
responsible for creating government policy. The Fundamental Law changed the former 
constitutional regulations stipulating that the Parliament first voted on the person and at the 
same time the governmental program of the Prime Minister. According to the “new” 
constitutional order the formation of the government begins with the election of the Prime 
Minister, and the Government receives the confidence and authorisation to govern from the 
parliamentary majority by the election of the Prime Minister. Without the support of the 
parliamentary majority the Prime Minister cannot form a government, and cannot define the 
general policy. Contrary to the previous regulations the Fundamental Law does not bind the 
election of the Prime Minister to the adoption of the government program, and does not 
define substantially what the general government policy means. The rule also cannot be 
founded which tells when and how the Prime Minister is obligated to show the government’s 
general policy to the public. Thus the Fundamental Law, besides abolishing the vote on the 
government’s general policy, leaves ‘place’ for the Prime Minister to define the form and 
substance of the government’s policy. Therefore the Prime Minister has received strong 
legal support to be the political leader of the government, representing the whole 
government in public and international relations. As the head of the executive power he 
represents the government policy and significantly influences the functioning of the public 
administration.
Another important characteristic of the “chancellor-type” government model and one 
of the most important sources of the Prime Minister’s power is the Prime Minister’s 
discretional right to select ministers. This is why a phrase can be created: the government 
has not gained a leader but rather the Prime Minister has won a government. Selecting and 
dismissing ministers – of course through the head of state, with respect to party power 
relations – are the Prime Minister’s exclusive tasks. The different form of political 
responsibility of the Prime Minister and the ministers is one of the main components of the 
    8 There are several signs of presidentialisation, among which the following should be 
emphasized: the widening of the powers of the head of Government, the centralisation of political 
processes and government communication, the strengthening of the oversight competences of the 
Prime Minister’s Office, the strengthening of the influence of background institutions, the exponential 
multiplication of the Prime Minister’s personal advisors, the growing number of technocrats and 
politicians with no party ties, the growing of financial funds available for the Prime Minister, etc.
    9 In international comparison the head of government in Italy has a really weak, and the British 
Prime Minister has a very strong position.
10 Article 18 paragraph 1 of the Fundamental Law: “The Prime Minister shall define the general 
policy of the Government”. 
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Prime Minister’s wide range of motions upon appointing and dismissing the members of 
the government. Of course the range of motions of the Prime Minister is in close connection 
with his party background and the coalition composition of the government.11
The weight of the Prime Minister within the government is further increased by the 
German-type “constructive” vote of confidence and the lack of parliamentary vote of 
confidence of individual ministers. Article 18 paragraph 4 of the Fundamental Law defines 
the responsibility of the government members with regards to the Prime Minister and the 
Parliament. Unlike the classic rules of “parliamentarism” ministers actually can only have 
such political responsibility with regards to the Prime Minister which can in fact result in 
their dismissal. Members of parliament have only weaker tools in order to enforce 
parliamentary responsibility of government members (question, interpellation, report, and 
hearing). Therefore the Parliament may only dismiss ministers together with the whole 
government, which further strengthens the position of the Prime Minister against the 
Parliament.
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARLIAMENT  
AND THE GOVERNMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFIDENCE
The Hungarian transition created a parliamentary system of government, in which the role 
of the Government is fundamental constitutional that depends on the confidence of and is 
responsible to the majority of the Parliament. According to both the Hungarian and the 
continental traditions the responsibility of the executive branch towards the Parliament – as 
the main carrier of people’s sovereignty – creates the democratic legitimacy of the 
Government. In parliamentary systems the government is created by the political parties 
that have majority in the Parliament, and the close cooperation between the governing 
parties and the executive branch creates the stability of the government. Political confidence 
is the key to the relationship between the government and the Parliament. The erosion of 
political trust may sink government efforts and cause a series of government crises, whereas 
its presence may secure the governing capability and freedom of action of the government. 
In parliamentary systems the most important tool that the Parliament has control over is the 
government, namely the vote of censure. The censure motion against the Government is the 
most important constitutional sanctioning tool of the Parliament in overseeing the executive 
power.
It can be clearly read from the regulating concept of the Fundamental Law that the 
confidence of the Parliament towards the Government is connected to the Prime Minister.12 
11 In a coalition government the Prime Minister is tied by the coalition agreement, in which the 
distribution of ministries between the parties is laid down. He has to keep this agreement otherwise he 
risks the dissolution of the coalition government. If the Prime Minister has to lead a minority 
government, then it is more possible that in exchange for political support he offers a ministerial 
position to the opposition. In the case of a one-party government with a strong majority, the Prime 
Minister’s manoeuvring space is widened if he is also the party chairman and he controls the decision 
making bodies of the party.
12 ”The Parliament shall elect the Prime Minister, decide upon questions of confidence relating 
to the Government;.” [Article 1. paragraph 2 of the Basic Law] “Members of the Government shall 
give account of their activities to Parliament, and ministers shall give account of their activities to the 
Prime Minister.” [Article 18. paragraph 4 of the Fundamental Law.]
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It is demonstrated in the fact that the Parliament expresses its confidence by electing the 
Prime Minister, and by a censure vote the Government is also overthrown. The vote of 
confidence expresses certain political opinions, the support of the Prime Minister who 
represents government policy, giving him authorisation to form a government and define 
the political direction. The twin sister of political confidence – in a parliamentary system 
based on the separation of powers – is political responsibility. The government is responsible 
to the Parliament for its activities, which is exercised in various forms by the Parliament 
(question, interpellation, report, committee hearing, and investigative committee). The loss 
of political trust may result in the gravest sanction of political accountability: the dissolution 
of the Government. The Fundamental Law differentiates between the accountability of the 
Government as a body and the members of the government, but it does not stipulate the 
type and basis of accountability. According to the character of parliamentary systems the 
accountability of the government and its members mean political accountability that is 
based on the political actions and decisions of the executive branch and the ministers. 
Members of the Government are also accountable in a legal sense, but these regulations do 
not differ from the regulations regarding other state officials.
The Fundamental Law – upholding the former constitutional concepts – makes it only 
possible for the Parliament to express no confidence by its own initiative towards the 
Government via censure motion. This is the strongest sanctioning tool of the Parliament, 
originally introduced by Act XL of 1990.13 The fundamental part of the constructive motion 
of no confidence14 is that the Parliament may only dismiss the Government if the election of 
a new Prime Minister occurs at the same time. The Parliament may raise the issue of 
confidence if at least one-fifth of the members of parliament initiate a motion of no 
confidence – also indicating the person nominated for Prime Minister – against the current 
Prime Minister. The motion of no confidence becomes constructive because it may only be 
initiated along with the nomination of the new Prime Minister. The censure motion may 
only be directed at the current Prime Minister, and it affects the mandate of the whole 
Government. For the adoption of the censure vote the vote of the majority of the members 
of Parliament is needed (absolute majority). In case of a successful15 censure motion the 
mandate of the Prime Minister and that of the Government is terminated and the new Prime 
Minister is to be considered elected. In the past decades the censure motion helped the 
stability of the governments after the transition, by preventing the formation of ad hoc 
political alliances that would have led to long lasting political crises.
13 The German type censure motion was introduced by Prime Minister Antall József in order to 
retain governability. The MDF-SZDSZ Pact of 29 April 1990 made it possible to pass the necessary 
amendment of the Constitution. See in detail: Bihari (2005) 395. 
14 “A motion of no confidence against the Prime Minister may be introduced in writing – along 
with the nomination of the candidate for the new Prime Minister – by no less than one-fifth of all 
Members of Parliament. (…)The Prime Minister may propose a vote of confidence. Parliament is 
considered to express its lack of confidence in the Prime Minister unless in the vote of confidence 
proposed by the Prime Minister the majority of Members of Parliament supports the Prime Minister’s 
proposal.” [Article 21. paragraph 1 and 3 of the Fundamental Law].
15 International experience shows the diminishing political role of motions of no confidence. In 
Germany it was only used once, and is has not been used in Hungary until April 2009. Even in this 
case it was not used as the opposition’s tool to replace the Prime Minister, but the governing parties 
used it as a quick way to replace their – politically failed – Prime Minister without involving the 
President.
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Alternatively, the censure vote does not mean the Parliament’s controlling role over 
the Government, but rather it is a tool of government dominance over Parliament. Mostly it 
is used to discipline rogue members of the governing party. Its function is not to enforce 
political accountability, it is a governing tool in cases when the support of a motion is 
doubtful, or the re-establishment of trust towards the Government is needed. The Prime 
Minister may raise the question of confidence in two ways. The first way is when the head 
of government moves for a censure vote in the Parliament. This mainly happens when the 
Prime Minister notices the decrease in support of the parliamentary majority, and he wants 
to measure the presence or absence of confidence. If more than half of the members of 
Parliament support the Prime Minister and his government, he has won, and can continue 
working. In the other, more special case, the Prime Minister asks the censure vote in 
connection with a government motion in the Parliament. In this case the majority needed to 
win the vote depends on the motion to which it is bound. If only a simple majority is needed 
to adopt the bill, then a simple majority is enough to uphold confidence. In the – rather rare 
– case when the Government asks for the censure vote in connection with a motion that 
requires a two-thirds majority to pass, then the failure may only be avoided by gathering 
such a majority. The decision on censure motions have to be made no sooner than three, but 
not later than eight days after the motion. If the Parliament expresses no confidence in a 
vote initiated by the Prime Minister, then it automatically – ex lege – leads to the termination 
of the Prime Minister’s and the Government’s mandate.
5. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE GOVERNMENT
The Fundamental Law does not include the actual functioning16 of the government, or its 
decision making process, such regulations can be found in lower level legislation. The 
Rules of Procedure17 of the Government stipulates that the Government carries out its 
functions as a body, with the leadership of the Prime Minister. Therefore the debating forum 
of government members is the government session. The Government, as a body is entitled 
with the powers associated with legislation, the right to initiate bills, the right to issue 
decrees and make decisions. The government as a body controls any subordinated bodies, 
carries out its legal responsibilities, and may give orders to its members, the ministers. The 
corporate character of the Government has decreased because of the transformation of 
government activities (presidentialisation, personification, and mediatisation). The 
Fundamental Law also made changes in a constitutional sense, because whereas the former 
constitution expressively named government sessions as the decision making forum of the 
government, the Fundamental Law does not include the concept of government session, and 
does not refer to this term. The “constitutional minimum” of corporate functioning was 
replaced by the level of government decision. The strengthening of the Prime Minister’s 
powers as opposed to corporate characteristics is also indicated by the fact that upon 
authorisation by the Rules of Procedure, if it is especially necessary, the Prime Minister 
16 Article 16 of the Fundamental Law: “(1) The members of the Government shall be the Prime 
Minister and the ministers. (2) The Prime Minister shall appoint one or more deputy Prime Ministers 
from among the ministers by means of a decree. (8) The Government is considered formed upon 
appointment of the ministers.”
17 Article 18 paragraph 5 is carried out and the more effective functioning of the Government is 
aided by the Ksztv. The detailed rules of the functioning of the Government are laid down in the Rules 
of Procedure of the Government [see Government decision 1144/ 2010. (VII.7.)].
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can – on his own right – issue government decrees when the Government is not in session.18 
Besides constitutional changes, the diminishing of corporate character is also indicated by 
the decreasing number of formal government sessions, and the increasing number of 
informal consultations and informal government sittings.19
The Government holds sessions regularly – weekly – as set forth in its half-year 
timetable with monthly timing. The Rules of Procedure describes the regulations for 
preparing government sessions, it sets forth that every motion and report submitted to the 
government session has to be discussed first at the session of the Ministers of State for 
Public Administration20 Ministers, have to be present in person, in the case of hindrance the 
appointed state secretary is allowed to substitute, and if he also cannot be present, the 
Minister of State for Public Administration takes part in the session, without voting rights. 
The list of invited persons is described in the Rules of Procedure; the Head of the National 
Bank has to be invited whenever the Government session deals with a case within his 
authority. The Government has a quorum if more than half of its members are present. 
Government members have equal voting rights, decisions are made with majority of votes; 
in case of unanimous decision the Prime Minister’s vote decides. In fact the Government 
does not make its decisions with a majority and a formal voting procedure; there is no 
chance to outvote the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister chairs Government sessions, and 
he calls the decisions made in the session. Despite all this the Government should not 
become the forum that confirms the decisions of the Prime Minister, because for Government 
decisions, the whole government, therefore each minister is responsible to the Parliament.
6. THE STRENGTHENING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL CENTRE
The Government may form cabinets that are entitled to give an opinion before Government 
sessions in important issues of social, economic or national security policy. Members of the 
cabinets are the ministers, affected and other persons appointed by them. The Government 
may form a Government panel in order to coordinate any significant tasks that fall in the 
purview of multiple ministries. Failing an Act of Parliament or a Government decree, the 
cabinet and the government panel has no decision making authority. The Government – by 
a normative decision – may appoint a Government commissioner in order to fulfil tasks that 
do not fall within the purview of any ministry. A minister, an undersecretary, administrative 
undersecretary, deputy undersecretary, or any other person that does not fall into the above 
mentioned categories may be appointed in order to carry out a task that falls within 
the purview of the Government. The Government commissioner’s work is supervised by 
the Prime Minister; he may be appointed for a finite period of a maximum of two years. 
18 ”The Prime Minister between sessions of the Government – in a case of urgency – may issue 
a Government decision in cases of delegating tasks, carrying out international negotiations and 
signing agreements, organising visits, in some cases of appointments and dismissals, and in giving 
decorations; furthermore in other cases – by authorisation of the Government – he may issue 
Government decrees and decisions. (Rules of Procedure, point 77.).
19 Mandák (2012) 30–41. 
20 The Session of Ministers of State for Public Administration is a preparatory, administrative 
coordinating and supervising forum created after the system change. The most important participants 
of this session are the Ministers of State for Public Administration, but there are several other invitees 
of the Conference. The Rules of Procedure of the Government decides on the list of people to be 
invited. 
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The Prime Minister may appoint a Prime Minister’s commissioner by virtue of a normative 
order to carry out a task within the Prime Minister’s authority. The Prime Minister’s 
commissioner may be entitled with controlling powers by virtue of a Prime Minister’s 
decree; his mandate lasts until the termination of the Prime Minister’s mandate. The 
Government may create other initiative or consultative bodies.
The Prime Minister’s Office, which – by the Act XX of 2014 on the ministries of 
Hungary – have been given the rank of the ministry that coordinates the Government’s 
work, has great importance concerning the functioning of the entire Government. The Prime 
Minister’s Office,21 which first functioned as the Prime Minister’s working body, became 
responsible for governmental coordination, has lately also taken the place of the former 
Ministry of justice and public administration, thus turning into a “super-chancery”. After 
the election of 2010 the former Prime Minister’s Office, as a Government agency ceased to 
exist, and most of its competences were integrated into the Ministry of justice and public 
administration. By turning the former Cabinet Office into the new Prime Minister’s Office, 
a new Government organisation was created. After the election of 2014 the justice functions 
were separated and the supreme body of Governmental coordination was re-created as a 
ministry, the leader of which has the rank of Minister.22 The founding document of the 
Office of the Prime Minister lists 17 competences that fall within the tasks of the Minister 
of the Prime Minister’s Office.23 The statute defines the Prime Minister’s Office as the 
working organisation of the Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, which is special 
administrative body, supervised by the Government. The new regulation brought significant 
changes to the legal status and the duties of the Prime Minister’s Office. As for its legal 
status, the Act on the ministries of Hungary removes it from other ministries, as the Ministry 
primarily responsible for governmental coordination. In the period between 2010-2014 the 
Prime Minister’s Office was the working organisation of the Prime Minister. It was led by 
an undersecretary, and its main function was defined as assisting the Prime Minister and 
participating in the formation of the Government’s general policy. Therefore, according 
to the new statute, it is no longer the working body of the Prime Minister; however it is 
still directly supervised by the head of government. Out of its especially wide competences, 
consisting of several special policy areas, the dominant characteristic is the task of 
coordinating Government policy and the strategic leading of the public administration. 
21 “The basic institution of the indeed chancellor-like, personified governing is the Government 
“flagship”, the Prime Minister’s Office, which the people started calling chancery… as in 1998 the 
PMO of the Orbán government means the shifting of government structure towards a chancellor 
system, in 2002 it became more founded to say that the PMO that organised its own structure became 
a special kind of top ministry within the Government, which is indicated by the solution unknown in 
Western democracies that the minister leading the PMO became the general deputy of the Prime 
Minister.” Sárközy (2012) 241–242. 
22 The Prime Minister issued the founding document of the Prime Minister’s Office based on 
Article 8 of Act CXCV of 2011 on the Public Finances in 24 July 2014. 
23 These are the following: coordination of Government activities, quality management and 
personnel policy of the public administration, development of public administration, organisation of 
public administration, legal supervision of local governments, use of EU funds, agricultural and rural 
development, research and development and technical innovation, public procurement, development 
policy, protection of cultural heritage, development of settlements, coordination of civil intelligence 
services, postal functions, coordination of social policy, coordination of science policy, coordination 
of governmental PR, carrying out public policy research, incorporating Hungarian and international 
experiences, and other preparatory services. 
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By interpreting the statute and the Rules of Procedure together, the Prime Minister’s Office 
is actually the Prime Minister’s working organisation in a broad sense.24 In the Prime 
Minister’s Office nine secretaries – among them one Minister of State for Public 
Administration – and almost thirty deputy secretaries assist in the work of the Government. 
According to the portfolio and the new ministry status of the Prime Minister’s Office the 
“chancery-minister” leading the Office has a stronger legal and political power than any of 
his predecessors. The Prime Minister is aided by a large professional apparatus in 
determining the general policy of the Government, exercising professional and political 
oversight over the public administration, and in managing daily duties of governing. The 
new profile of the “chancery” integrated in itself several strategic policy areas (agricultural 
development, European Union development areas, national financial services, the post, 
local public administration), therefore becoming a sort of “government in the Government”. 
So there was a paradigm shift in the functioning of the Prime Minister’s Office. From the 
working organisation of the Prime Minister, it became a Governmental power centre with a 
broad range of competences, and thus the main holder and primary basis of the centralised 
power of the head of government. The power of the Prime Minister, which was strengthened 
by the Fundamental Law, is aided by an institutional structure that holds in itself the seeds 
of turning into a presidential system.
In the preparatory phase of the Government’s decision making process, and in 
coordination with the functioning of the public administration, the Session of Ministers of 
State for Public Administration plays a key role. This session is the Government’s general 
preparatory organisation; every proposal that goes to a Government session has to be 
discussed by this session first. The Session of Ministers of State for Public Administration 
is summoned by the Minister of State for Public Administration of the Prime Minister’s 
Office; he is also responsible for the schedule of the CAU. In the period 2010-2014, together 
with the weakening of the coordinative role of the Ministry of Justice and Administration, 
the preparatory role of this session has also diminished. In many ways the most important 
forum of professional and political discussions became the Session of Parliamentary State 
Secretaries that was led by the Parliamentary State Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office. 
In the new role of the Prime Minister’s Office after the elections, the traditional 
administrative preparatory role of the Session of Ministers of State for Public Administration 
may become more appreciated.
7. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
According to Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Ksztv. central administrative bodies are: the 
Government, Government committees, the ministries, the autonomous administrative 
bodies, Government agencies, law enforcement agencies, the Military National Security 
Service, and autonomous regulatory bodies.25 In this paper the focus is on the role of 
ministries and autonomous administrative bodies.
24 This is pointed out in Article 8 of the organisational regulations describing the tasks of the 
Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office: “he sees to the carrying out of the tasks defined by the Prime 
Minister” and “he participates in the public policy founding of the Prime Minister’s decisions and in 
carrying them out”.
25 Autonomous administrative bodies are the Office of Public Procurement, the Equal Treatment 
Authority, the Hungarian Competition Authority, the National Authority of Data Protection and 
Freedom of Information, and the National Elections Office. Government offices are the Central 
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The election of 2010 brought the most radical change of Government structure in 
the past twenty years.26 In the Hungarian constitutional system the Prime Minister has 
– especially if there is no coalition’s political pressure – a really wide range of motions to 
create the structure of ministries. Regulations of the Fundamental Law make it clear27 that a 
ministry may only be created by an Act of Parliament, the adaptation of which requires only 
a simple majority. The structure of the Government represents the political priorities of the 
Government, emphasizing the importance of various fields. In a balanced political arena the 
opposition does not challenge the right of the governing majority to fit the Government’s 
structure to its political views. The ministerial structure laid down in Act XX of 2014, with 
minor changes it preserved the main characteristics of the governmental re-shaping carried 
out four years earlier.28 The Act differentiates between the Office of the Prime Minister as a 
ministry responsible for governmental coordination, and other ministries responsible for a 
specific policy field. The change in the name of the four ministries (Ministry of Human 
Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Foreign Policy) is in connection with the change of function and with the purpose of making 
a more specific profile for the ministries. The structure of grand ministries was broken by 
the establishment of separated ministry of justice and by the clarification of the agricultural 
affairs, but the basic model of grand ministries has not changed. The “super chancery” 
Office of the Prime Minister has been arise above other ministries.
The legal regulation of ministries is based on the Act on the organisation of the 
Government (Ksztv.), which not only defines the organisational structure of ministries, but, 
quite oddly, it gives a definition for ministries as well. The ministry – as the working 
organisation of the minister – is a Government controlled central administrative body 
having specialised tasks. It is a top level Government office with decision making privileges, 
which carries out the continuous management of state matters in specific policy areas.29 The 
minister controls the ministry and in this competence he oversees the work of Ministers of 
State for Public Administration and Parliamentary State Secretaries. The minister, the 
Ministers of State for Public Administration, Parliamentary State Secretaries deputy 
Statistical Office, the National Nuclear Energy Authority, the Hungarian Intellectual Property Office, 
and the National Tax and Customs Administration. Law Enforcement Agencies are the police, the 
staff of the correctional facilities, the professional disaster prevention authority and the civil national 
security services. Autonomous regulatory bodies are the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority, the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority.
26 By significant decrease of the number of ministries eight integrated ministries have been 
formed: Ministry of Justice and Public Administration, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Economy, Ministry of National Resources, Ministry 
of National Development, Ministry of Rural Development. See more: Smuk (2011) 367–369. 
27 According to Article 17 of the Fundamental Law: “(1) The ministries shall be listed in an act 
of Parliament. (4) The provisions of an implementing act regarding the designation of ministries, 
ministers or administrative bodies may be amended by an act of Parliament.” 
28 According to Article 1 of the Act on the ministries of Hungary: “the ministries of Hungary are 
the Prime Minister’s Office as a ministry with the primary function of governmental coordination and 
the ministries of special policy areas. The ministries of special policy areas are: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Human 
Capacities, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of National Development, Ministry for 
National Economy”.
29 Petrétei (2013) 162. 
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secretaries are state leaders. Within this group the minister and the Parliamentary State 
Secretaries qualify as political leaders, while the Ministers of State for Public Administration 
and the deputy secretary are administrative leaders. The biggest difference between political 
leaders and administrative leaders is that the mandate of political leaders is connected to the 
mandate of the Government, while the appointment of administrative leaders is for an 
unspecified period, is not in connection with the Government’s mandate.30
The Government specifies the detailed tasks and competences of the minister in a 
decree.31 The position of a minister is not only a Government position, but it is a politician’s 
status, in which case political accountability and confidence plays an important role. 
Besides the professional accomplishments, his work is evaluated in a political way each 
time he is present in front of the Parliament. As the task of a minister without portfolio 
includes only such tasks that can be specified that do not fall into the authority of any 
ministry. It is important that the minister may appoint a Minister’s Commissioner in order 
to carry out a task within the Minister’s purview.32 The Fundamental Law differentiates 
between a minister leading a ministry and a minister without portfolio.33 The minister is 
nominated by the Prime Minister and is appointed by the President. The mandate of the 
minister is dependant on the Government’s mandate. Article 20 of the Fundamental Law 
specifies the cases when the mandate of the minister is terminated; the mandate of the 
minister ceases: a) when the Prime Minister’s mandate is terminated, b) if the minister 
resigns, c) if the minister’s mandate is revoked, d) if the minister dies.
The state secretaries are among the main leaders of a ministry. The secretary – with the 
exception of a few cases – is the full deputy of the minister. The secretary oversees the 
work of the deputy secretaries. The Act does not specify the number of secretaries. The 
secretary is nominated – after discussing it with the minister – by the Prime Minister, and is 
appointed by the President. The mandate of the secretary is terminated by the termination of 
the Prime Minister’s mandate, by resignation, by revoking his mandate, and by his/her 
death. The secretary is accountable towards the Minister and the head of Government for 
his exercise of powers.
30 The minister and the undersecretary are politicians and in this capacity they form the 
Government policy, take part in main Government decisions, and make their choice between policy 
alternatives based on political weighing of choices. In fact, administrative positions often get 
politicised, the politicising of public administration is a world phenomenon, therefore government 
changes often affect a larger group than actual political nominees. See: Stumpf (2011).
31 Decree 152/2014. (VI.6) on the tasks of the members of the Government. 
32 The appointing powers of the minister are limited. First he has to inform the administrative 
undersecretary of the Prime Minister’s Office, who may exercise his veto privileges, provided for by 
Article 71 of the Ksztv.
33 According to Article 18 of the Fundamental Law: “(2) The minister shall – within the 
framework of the general policy of the Government – autonomously run the sectors assigned under 
his or her competence, including the subordinate bodies, and perform the tasks assigned by the 
Government or the Prime Minister. (3) Members of the Government shall have authority to issue 
decrees under authorization by an act or government decree, in the performance of their respective 
duties, at their own discretion or in agreement with another minister. Such decrees, however, may not 
be contradictory to any act or government decree, or any decree of the Governor of the Hungarian 
National Bank.” According to Article 17 of the Fundamental Law: “Ministers without portfolio may 
be appointed to perform specific tasks determined by the Government”.
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The Ministers of State for Public Administration leads the office apparatus of the 
ministry, and oversees the work of deputy secretaries. Only one Minister of State for Public 
Administration may be appointed in each ministry. The Minister of State for Public 
Administration – unlike the secretary – is the administrative-professional leader of the 
ministry. Also appointed by the President of the Republic, but his appointment is for an 
unspecified duration. So the mandate of the Minister of State for Public Administration is 
not dependant on the Government’s mandate, but because of the political influence on the 
public administration, this post is often replaced when a new government takes office.
The operative leading of the policy work of the ministry is done – under administrative 
oversight by the Minister of State for Public Administration and policy instructions of the 
secretary – by the deputy secretaries. Deputy Secretaries are appointed by the Prime 
Minister upon the nomination by the minister. The Secretary may control the work of 
several deputy secretaries, and deputy secretaries may also function under the oversight of a 
Government’s Commissioner. The deputy secretary is deputised by a Head of Department 
under his authority.
The gaining of ground by independent regulatory authorities is related to the 
strengthening of the state’s economic involvement. Modern public administration often 
steps outside of the traditional role of administrative authority and undertakes legislative 
tasks as well. This new role breaks with the logic of the separation of powers, because an 
administrative body, belonging to the executive branch, also has sui generis legislative 
functions; there is no administrative remedy against their decisions, however their decisions 
may be challenged at court. They carry out their tasks, mostly regulated by an Act of 
Parliament; independently form the leaders of the executive branch. The leaders of the 
autonomous regulatory authorities are mostly appointed by the Prime Minister or by the 
President for a finite period, and there is no option to revoke their mandate. Autonomous 
regulatory authorities are mostly found in the field of financial administration, media 
administration and in the energy sector.
Article 23 of the Fundamental Law, unlike the former constitution, has elevated the 
autonomous regulatory authorities to a constitutional level.34 The Fundamental Law only 
created framework regulations, and made it the Parliament’s sphere to establish these bodies 
via cardinal statutes. According to the most important constitutional regulations, only the 
Parliament can create autonomous regulatory authorities by cardinal statute, in order to 
carry out specific tasks within the purview of the executive branch. By authorisation of an 
Act of Parliament, the leader of an autonomous regulatory authority may issue decrees. The 
head of the autonomous regulatory authority has to present a yearly report to the Parliament, 
and receives his mandate from the Prime Minister or the President for a finite period of 
time. Both accountability rules and the rules of appointment strengthen the independence of 
34 “(1) Parliament shall have authority to establish autonomous regulatory agencies in an 
implementing act for carrying out certain tasks and exercising certain competencies of the executive 
branch. (2) The heads of autonomous regulatory agencies shall be appointed by the Prime Minister, or 
by the President of the Republic on a recommendation by the Prime Minister, for a period specified 
by an implementing act. The heads of autonomous regulatory agencies shall appoint their deputy or 
deputies.” [Article 23. of the Basic Law].
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these bodies. In parliamentary democracies autonomous regulatory authorities appear as a 
limitation to the centralisation of Government powers, and in some areas they limit the 
manoeuvring space of the Government.35
8. SUMMARY
The aim of this paper is to show the change in the constitutional situation of the Government 
by describing the regulations of the Basic Law and comparing them to the previous 
Constitution. This way the double function of the Government and the role of the Prime 
Minister are emphasized. The paper concludes that the presidentialisation of politics affects 
the role of the Prime Minister within the Government. Among the causes of this process the 
paper nominates the weakening of traditional social breaking points, the re-composition of 
the role of the state, the globalisation of politics, and the appreciation of mass 
communication. Among the most important points of presidentialisation the paper discusses 
the widening of the powers of the head of government, the centralisation of political 
processes and Government communication, and the strengthening of the supervisory role of 
the Prime Minister’s Office. The position of the Government, as a corporate type body, is 
discussed through presenting its relationship with the Parliament. The relationship of 
various administrative bodies and the Government is presented via the radical government 
reform after the 2010 election, and it is concluded that the Prime Minister has great freedom 
in creating the ministerial structure. The ministerial structure reflects the policy priorities of 
the Government by emphasizing specific policy areas. One of the most important changes 
in the constitutional regulations was the appearance of regulatory authorities and bodies. 
The appreciation of these bodies may be explained with the strengthening of the 
Government’s economic role: the modern public administration must step out from the 
traditional framework of administration, and must be given legislative powers in its new 
role.
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